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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
opinion of the writer, place the rescinding vendee in 4 position where
he could obtain complete relief. 4
WILLIAM F. PODESTA.
THE FORMATION OF PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE MoTIVE OF EVADING
THE WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION LAW.
"One of the methods used by this unscrupulous group
has been the creation of fictitious partnerships designed
to mask the relationship of employer and employee."
Governor Herbert H. Lehman.'
A great number of entrepreneurs have recently adopted the part-
nership form of business organization avowedly for the purpose of
evading their obligations under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
Some of these partnerships have been upheld by the courts, while
certain others have not. It will be the scope of this article to analyze
the cases on the subject and provide a touchstone to which the lawyer
may bring his problem.
Associations formed to conduct a business contrary to law or to
public policy are clearly illegal. 2 Associations formed for the pur-
suance of an illegal method of conducting an otherwise legal business
64 "Rescission will bar a recovery of damage when the only damage sus-
tained is not getting what was bargained for, and no special damage has been
sustained. According to the weight of authority, if special damage has been
sustained, so that the * * * [rescinding] party is damaged, notwithstanding the
rescission, his rescission of the contract will not bar a recovery of such special
damage." American Pure Food Co. v. G. W. Elliott & Co., 151 N. C. 393,
396, 66 S. E. 451, 452 (1909).
1 Address of Governor Herbert H. Lehman to the New York Legislature
Jan. 4, 1939. New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 5, 1939, p. 15, col. 8.
2 "An indispensable element of every partnership is a contract between the
parties for the sharing as common owners of the, profits of a lawful business."
47 C. J. (1929) p. 643, § 1, n.5(B). A partnership may be illegal on the
ground that it was formed for a purpose forbidden by the current notions of
morality, religion or public policy. 1 LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIPS (5th ed. 1888)
111. There are jurisdictions which go so far as to hold that: "In contempla-
tion of law an association of persons formed for an illegal purpose, or one
against public policy, is Anot a partnership." Jackson v. Akron Brick Ass'n,
53 Ohio St. 303, 41 N. E. 257 (1895). And a "partnership cannot be legally
formed to carry on any illegal or fraudulent scheme". Sampson v. Shaw, 101
Mass. 145 (1869); Dunhan v. Presby, 120 Mass. 285 (1876). The court, in
such cases, reasons that since an illegal contract is void, and a partnership must
result from a contract, the partnership contract is in effect a contract to form
an illegal contract and therefore void and the partnership never begins to exist.
This does not seem to be the law in New York; see note of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws to corresponding provision (Section 6) of the Uniform
Partnership Act. PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PART-
NERSHIP (Ist ed. 1933) 7n.
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are illegal.3 More difficulty arises, however, when we consider the
status of associations of which both the purpose and method are legal,
but which are formed with the motive of escaping legal obligations.
4
Workmen's Compensation and similar social legislation have been
enacted in the pursuance of a belief in their value as a means of pro-
tecting working men and their dependents from want in case of in-
jury in the course of certain specified employments. 5 It was the
intent of the legislature, by making the compensation for injury, or
death, a part of the expense of those businesses included in the Act,6
to secure injured workmen and their dependents from becoming ob-
jects of charity.7
The construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the courts
have held, must be liberal, and doubts must be resolved in favor of
the employee or his dependents.8 Above all, the construction must
be one which will effect the purposes for which the Act was passed
and prevent evasion by employers. 9 The courts have also held that
a waiver of the provisions of the Act would be null and void as
against public policy 10 Thus any agreement to waive the provisions
of the Act even though'it pretends to take the form of a partnership
agreement, is illegal as against public policy."
But a contract which places a person in one of the classes ex-
cluded from the benefits of the Act is legal.12 To come under the
Act the relationship of employer and employee must be established.' 8
The courts of this state have constantly held that a member of a part-
nership can not be an employee thereof within the contemplation of
the Workmen's Compensation Law.14  This is true even though he
3 See Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 650; 47 C. J. (1929) p. 651, § 44, n.68.
4 "'Motive' is that which prompts the choice or moves the Will, thereby
inciting or inducing action, while 'purpose' is that which one sets before himself
as the result to be kept in view or object to be attained." Kessler v. Indianapo-
lis, 199 Ind. 420, 157 N. E. 547, 549 (1927). "'Method', properly speaking, is
only placing and performing several operations in the most convenient order."
Hornblower v. Boulton, 8 Durn. & E. 95, 106, 101 Eng. Rep. 1285, 1292 (1799).
5N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 3.
6 Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916).
7 Matter of Petrie, 215 N. Y. 335, 109 N. E. 549 (1915).
s Winfield v. New York Cent. & H. R. R., 216 N. Y. 284, 110 N. E. 614
(1915):1 Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 217 N. Y. 627, 111 N. E. 1092 (1916).
9 Delinousha v. RJational Biscuit Co., 248 N. Y, 93, 161 N. E. 431 (1928).
2o By statute in N. Y., N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 32: "No
agreement by an employee to waive his right to compensation under this chapter
shall be vali'.
"3 Nelson v. American Cement and Plaster Co., 84 Kan. 797, 115 Pac. 578
(1911); Angell v. White Eagle Oil and Refining Co., 169 Minn. 183, 210
N. W. 1004 (1926); People v. Levine, 160 Misc. 181, 288 N. Y. Supp. 476
(1936).
12 People v. Kaplan, 160 Misc. 179, 288 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1936).
13 See Note (1935) 10 IND. L. J. 268.
14 Lyle v. R. H. Lyle Cider and Vinegar Co., 243 N. Y. 257, 153 N. E. 67
(1926); Duprea v. Duprea Bros., 224 App. Div. 673, 229 N. Y. Supp. 852
(3d Dept. 1928); Munter v. Ideal Peerless Laundry, 229 App. Div. 56, 241
N. Y. Supp. 411 (3d Dept. 1930); Schweitzer v. The Thompson and Norris
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draws a salary in payment for the general work of the partnership in
addition to his share of the profits.15 The immunity granted by our
Act to working members of a partnership has resulted in an epidemic
of partnerships in the hazardous trades and occupations in order to
save the cost of insurance.16 In certain cases the courts have upheld
the partnerships, and in certain other cases the courts have refused
to uphold them. A comparison of People v. Kaplan'1 with People
v. Levine '$ will serve to illustrate.
In the Kaplan case, the defendant, a contractor engaged in the
demolition of buildings, admitted the formation of a partnership with
his laborers for the purpose of saving the heavy expenses of compen-
sation insurance. Under the agreement the parties agreed to share
equally in the "obligations and profits" in connection with the demo-
lition of the building for which the partners contracted. The court,
in its decision upholding the partnership, said: "While this plan of
forming partnerships has become a habit of this particular defendant,
there is not sufficient legal evidence to justify a holding that no part-
nership was in fact or in law created," and "It, therefore, follows
that even though the partnership was created to evade the require-
ments of the Workmen's Compensation Law, no liability may be im-
posed if in truth and in fact a partnership was created. * * * I do
not desire to condone the actions of the defendant. His plan of sav-
ing the cost of compensation insurance not only furnishes no protec-
tion to the laborers but enables him to compete unfairly with con-
tractors who comply strictly with our laws and statutes and who do
not seek refuge in such subterfuges. Unfortunately, however, the
record in this case furnishes no basis for a contrary holding. In an-
other case, other elements not established in this case might be pres-
ent which would justify the courts in disregarding the written part-
nership agreement. The question is one of degree." 19
The necessary basis was found in the Levine case decided by the
same judge about a month later.20 In the Levine case, the defendant,
a contractor, admitted the reason for the formation of the partnership
Co., 229 N. Y. 97, 127 N. E. 904 (1920) (There is nothing in the Workmen's
Compensation Law nor in the decisions construing the law which justifies the
application of any definition of the relation between employee and employer
other than that which has always obtained at common law).
15 Nevills v. Moore Mining Co., 135 Cal. 561, 67 Pac. 1054 (1902) ; Cooper
v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 177 Cal. 685, 171 Pac. 684(1918); Le Clear v. Smith, 207 App. Div. 71, 202 N. Y. Supp. 514 (3d Dept.
1923) ; McMillan v. Industrial Commission, 13 Ohio App. 310 (1920); Rocke-
feller v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 124, 197 Pac. 1038 (1921); Miller's
Indemnity Underwriters v. Patten, 238 S. W. 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922);
Ellis v. Ellis and Co. (1905) 1 K. B. 324. Contra: Knox & Shouse v. Knox,
120 Okla. 45, 250 Pac. 783 (1926).
16 People v. Levine, 160 Misc. 181, 288 N. Y. Supp. 476 (1936).
17 160 Misc. 179, 288 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1936).18 160 Misc. 181, 288 N. Y. Supp. 476 (1936).
'19 People v. Kaplan, 160 Misc. 179, 180, 288 N. Y. Supp. 474, 475 (1936).
20 Magistrate Perlman. The Kaplan case was decided on April 22, 1936;
the Levine case was decided on May 26, 1936.
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was to save the cost of insurance and put in evidence the partnership
agreement. The court held that: "Written articles of copartnership
certainly do not foreclose an inquiry into the question whether the
parties intended to, and actually did, create a real partnership." Here
the alleged partnership maintained no books of account or other rec-
ords and filed no income tax reports. All materials used by the part-
nership were purchased and paid for by the defendant from his own
personal bank account, and although the members of the partnership
under the name of the "Star Sand Blasting Co." were changed sev-
eral times no new certificate of doing business under an assumed name
was filed. These circumstances were such as to permit the court to
find that no partnership actually existed and it awarded compensation
to the plaintiff.
A closer case is York v. Industrial Commission 2 1 which came
before the Wisconsin courts. In that case Schlinger Memorials Inc.,
a monument company, finding business unprofitable because of the
high cost of compensation insurance, discharged its employees and
then rehired them as a partnership. The contract between the part-
nership of former employees and the monument company provided
for the leasing of the buildings of the company by the partnership,
and an agreement under which the partnership purchased all its ma-
terials from the company, sold all its products to the company, and
gave the company control of the amount of work to be done. The
net profits accruing to the partnership approximated the wages pre-
viously paid to the workmen. During the time that this agreement
was in force, the company insisted upon, and succeeded in, procuring
the dismissal of one of the partners. In an action brought by a part-
ner against the company for injuries suffered in the course of his
employment, the high court, reversing the circuit court, held that
there was a partnership and that the position of the plaintiff was that
of independent contractor, rather than that of employee, and conse-
quently he was not entitled to compensation under the Act.
21223 Wis. 140, 269 N. W. 726 (1936). Dissenting Judge Fairchild wrote:
"In Honnold, Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 66, it is said, 'When the doing of
the specific work is entrusted to one who exercises an independent employment,
and selects his own help, and has immediate control of them, and the right to
control the method of conducting the work, the contractor is an independent
contractor.' The control of the work, the duration, and the membership of the
partnership is literally, impliedly, and actually given to an outside individual,
the appellant company."
A different conclusion was reached by the Oklahoma court in a case involv-
ing similar facts. Five casers who bound themselves into a casing crew and
offered themselves for employment were held not a partnership but were all
considered employees of the one hiring the crew. Dixon Casing Crew v. State
Industrial Commission, 108 Okla. 211, 235 Pac. 605 (1925). This decision was
under an amendment to the Oklahoma statute, which reads: "Employee * * *
shall include workmen associating themselves together under an agreement for
the performance of a particular piece of work, in which event such persons so
associating themselves together shall be deemed employees of the person having
the work executed.'
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The attitude of the courts when confronted by a case involving
a corporation serves as an interesting comparison. 22  The majority
of the cases in this group concerns actions for insurance by injured
officers of the corporation.
In the early case of Browne v. Browne Co. 23 the plaintiff, the
majority stockholder of a corporation, was employed as its president.
His duties consisted of those usudlly performed by one in his posi-
tion and some manual work. The industrial commission found that
his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. The
Court of Appeals, reversing the award of the industrial commission,
held that "the higher executive officers of a corporation are not, as
such, its employees in the ordinary sense of the word" and that
"Theoretically he was subject to the orders of his corporation and
was liable to be discharged for disobedience. Practically he was the
corporation and only by a legal fiction its servant in any sense." 2 4
The court discussed this case with approval a few years later in
Matter of Skouitchi v. Chick Cloak and Suit Co.25 adding "But all
this would not preclude a person who was really an employee from
securing compensation as such for injuries received in the course
of his employment, even though he might hold a title as officer in a
corporation * * *. A corporation is a complete entity separate and
distinguishable from its stockholders and officers and if it sees fit to
have one of the latter serve it in the capacity of an ordinary employee
we see nothing to prevent it from so doing." 26 and in accordance
with this rule, the court awarded compensation to an employee en-
gaged in packing, shipping, selling and delivering goods at an average
weekly wage of $33.70, even though he bore the titles of president
and treasurer. But where the president of a firm did not receive a
special salary as worker, he was not awarded compensation. 27
22 See Note (1932) 81 A. L. R. 644.
23 221 N. Y. 28, 116 N. E. 364 (1917) ; Howard v. Howard, 221 N. Y. 605,
117 N. E. 1072 (1917).24 Browne v. Browne Co., 221 N. Y. 28, 116 N. E. 364 (1917). N. Y.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2(4) defines an employee as "a person who
is engaged in a hazardous employment in the service of an employer, carrying
on or conducting the same upon the premises of the plant, or in the course of
his employment away from the plant of his employer; and shall not include
farm laborers or domestic servants"; cf. FED. SocIAL SECURITY AcT, 49 STAT.
630 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. § 1011 (Supp. 1938) which defines the term
employee to include an officer of a corporation25 230 N. Y. 296, 130 N. E. 299 (1921).2 6Id. at 299.
27 Kolpein v. O'Donnell Lumber Co., 230 N. Y. 301, 130 N. E. 301 (1921):
The trend of the law may be readily seen by a comparison between the 1926
and the 1939 amendments to N. Y. WORKMEN'S ComPEN sATIo AcT § 54(6).
The 1926 amendment (N. Y. Laws 1926, c. 258) reads: "Employers or executive
officers of corporations shall not be included in the compensation insurance
contract unless they elect to be brought within the coverage of this chapter, in
which case such policies shall insure to such employers or officers the same
compensation provided for their employees, and at the same rates; provided,
however, that the estimation of their wage values, respectively, shall be reason-
[ VOL.. 14
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It is apparent then, that if the firm of A, B and C Inc. were to
hire A, its president and stockholder, to do manual work at a salary,
and A were injured, he would be entitled to workmen's compensa-
tion; 2" but if the firm of A, B and C were a partnership and the
partnership hired A to do certain manual work at a salary, and A
were injured, he would not be entitled to compensation. 9 It is the
unfair advantage, taken by unscrupulous employers, of this situation
that must be remedied.3 0
When deciding these cases the sole question considered by the
courts of this state is whether or not a partnership exists.31 If the
court finds that the organization is a partnership within the meaning
of Section 10 of the Partnership Law,3 2 no compensation is awarded;
if, on the other hand, the evidence is found insufficient to support a
partnership, compensation is awarded.33 But the determination of
whether or not a certain association is a partnership is not always
without difficulty.
The partnership relation is a contractual relation and like all
contracts depends upon the intention of the parties, 34 but the mere
fact that the parties intended to form a partnership and act in pur-
suance of this intention is not enough. Their acts must conform to
Section 10 of the Partnership Act.3 5 The contract creating a part-
nership is the best evidence of its existence; 36 yet if there is no con-
able and separately stated in and added to the valuation of their payrolls upon
which their premium is computed, the employer or officer so insured shall have
the same rights and remedies given an employee by this chapter." The 1939
amendment (N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 241, effective July 1, 1939) reads: "Insurance
of officers of corporations. Every executive officer of a corporation shall be
deemed to be included in the compensation insurance contract or covered under
a certificate of self-insurance unless he elects to be excluded from the coverage
of this chapter. Such election shall be made in writing * * *. The estimate
of their wage values, respectively, shall be reasonable and separately stated and
added to the valuation of the payrolls upon which the premium is computed.
The officers so insured shall have the same rights and remedies as any employee,
but any executive officer who files an election not to be included under this
chapter shall be deemed not to be an employee within the intent of this chapter."
28 Skouitchi v. Chick Cloak & Suit Co., 230 N. Y. 296, 130 N. E. 299
(1921).
29 See note 15, supra. In New York, if A, B and C intended to form a
corporation and the attempt failed so that not even a de facto corporation (but a
partnership) resulted, A would not be entitled to Workmen's Compensation
even though he took out and paid for a compensation policy. Munter v. Ideal
Peerless Laundry, 229 App. Div. 56, 241 N. Y. Supp. 411 (3d Dept. 1930);
PRASHKER, LAW OF PaIVaTE CORPORATIrOS (1st ed. 1937) 231.
30 See note 1, supra.
31 People v. Kaplan, 160 Misc. 179, 288 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1936).
32 "A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners a business for profit."
33 People v. Levine, 160 Misc. 181, 288 N. Y. Supp. 476 (1936).
34 Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Olds, 152 Misc. 876, 274 N. Y.
Supp. 349 (1934).
35 People v. Levine, 160 Misc. 181, 288 N. Y. Supp. 476 (1936).3 In re Gibb's Estate, Appeal of Halstead, 157 Pa. 59, 27 At. 383 (1893).
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tract the courts may imply one. 37 If there is a contract which com-
plies with Section 10 of the Partnership Act, a partnership is created,
notwithstanding the fact that no partnership was intended.38
From this it will be seen that the true test of a partnership is
not the intention of the parties, but the conduct of the parties. What,
then, must there be to create a partnership?
The test most popular with the courts, today, is the test of con-
trol. In Cohan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 the court
said: "At any rate it is clear that neither Cohan nor his mother
intended to carry on a joint business, for it does not appear that she
had the least direction of his affairs, or any part in the conduct of
the business. What he apparently meant was to give her half his
earnings in consideration of his filial affection for her, and for her
assistance in his early unprosperous years. However this unusual
gratitude may affect our estimate of his character, we have only to
consider whether he changed his legal rights. There can be no doubt
that he remained always free to stop his payments, and that her share
depended on the endurance of his feeling toward her." 40 Yet the
court upheld the partnership in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Olds.41 In that case the father agreed with his daughters to sell them
each a one-fourth interest in his property in exchange for their de-
mand notes for $400,000 each. The father was to have absolute
control of the business and each daughter was to have such profits
as their father "sees fit to pay them, and as they might need for their
living comforts." 42 If any of the daughters were dissatisfied with
the management of the business, she could withdraw and her note
was to be returned. A divided court 43 held this to be a partnership
within the meaning of the Revenue Act.44
Whether a partnership existed in that case depended upon the
enforceability of the promissory notes. A strong dissenting opinion
held that this was but an illusory promise and, hence, there was no
promise sufficient to support a contract.4 5 The dissenting judge also
held that there was no co-ownership, as the daughters did not con-
tribute anything to the firm property and the agreement to sell was
s7 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Olds, 152 Misc. 876, 274 N. Y.
Supp. 349 (1934).
38 Martin v. Peyton, 246 N. Y. 213, 158 N. E. 77 (1927).39 39 F. (2d) 540 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
40 Ad. at 542.
4160 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
42 Id. at 253.
43 Moorman and Simons, JJ., Hicks, J., dissenting.
4 REvENuE AcT oF 1936, § 901(a) (3), 49 STAT. 1756 (1936), 26 U. S.
C. A. g 1696(2) (Supp. 1938). "The term 'partnership' includes a syndicate,group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or by
means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and
which is not, within the meaning of this Act, a trust or estate or a corporation;
and the term 'partner' includes a member of such syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or organization." -4 5 WHIT EY, LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) § 9.
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insufficient in form to carry the legal title of the property to them.
Here the father merely placed the property in the partnership and
took the notes in consideration for the contract of sale.
In a consideration of this case it has been suggested that al-
though this is a partnership for tax liability under Section 901 (a) (3)
of the Revenue Act,46 it might not be a partnership for tort liability
under Section 10 of the Partnership Law. 47 "For tax liability and
tort liability involve different legal and economic factors, and a case
might be made for the proposition that the emphasis upon co-control
as a condition precedent to imposition of tort liability is not relevant
to the problem of interpreting the partnership section of the Revenue
Acts." 48
While the sharing of profits and losses is essential to a partner-
ship,49 and while the absence of an agreement to share the losses is a
strong circumstance against the existence of a partnership,50 sharing
in the profits does not necessarily establish a partnership,51 and a
share of the partnership profits given as compensation for services
rendered,5 2 or as interest on a loan,53 to the partnership, raises no
presumption that the recipient is a partner. To constitute a part-
nership it is not necessary that the parties agree upon a sharing of
the lossesA 4 Where a partnership exists, sharing of the losses can
be inferred by the court and the court can determine the manner of
distributing the profits where the contract fails to so provide.5 5 Even
where a contract exonerates a partner from losses, and provides that
one person shall assume all the risks of loss, and guarantee a profit
to the other, there is a valid partnership.5 6
Whether or not a partnership exists depends, therefore, upon
the facts of each case. As the definition and tests of a partnership
are not sufficient to exclude these undesirable associations another
solution must be sought. Three possible remedies are submitted:
46 See note 44, supra.
47 See note 32, supra.
48 See Note (1938) 4 Oio ST. L. J. 228, 232.
48 Net profit sharing is now generally regarded as strong, sometimes con-
clusive, evidence that the business is a partnership. Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L.
268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (1860); Runo v. Rothschild, 219 Mich. 560, 189 N. W.
183 (1922).
50 Cohimbian Laundry v. Hencken, 203 App. Div. 140, 196 N. Y. Supp. 523
(1st Dept. 1922).
51 Winters v. Miller, 227 Mich. 602, 199 N. W. 642 (1924) ; In re Rosen-
berg, 213 App. Div. 167, 209 N. Y. Supp. 315 (2d Dept. 1925).
52 Klein v. Kirchbaum, 240 Mich. 368, 215 N. W. 289 (1927); Barker v.
Kraft, 259 Mich. 70, 242 N. W. 841 (1932); Smith v. Bodine, 74 N. Y. 30
(1878) ; Schuster v. Largman, 308 Pa. 520, 162 Atl. 305 (1932).
53 In re Mission Farms Dairy, 56 F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932);
Black v. Brundage, 125 Cal. App. 641, 13 P. (2d) 999 (1932). Contra:
Drinkelspeil v. Lewis, 50 Wyo. 380, 62 P. (2d) 294 (1937); PRAsHK.R, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 48.
54 Carter v. Wright, 275 I1. App. 224 (1934).
55 In re Owl Drug Co., 12 F. Supp. 439 (D. C. Nev. 1935).
56 Stafford v. First Nat. Bank, 178 Ark. 997, 13 S. W. (2d) 21 (1929).
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1-The courts may hold that a partner engaged in manual labor
is an employee and, therefore, entitled to compensation. The courts
of Oklahoma in the case of Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial
Commission 57 adopted this method. In that case, all work was done
by the members of the partnership, who, because it was a hazardous
enterprise, insured themselves. The suit was brought by an injured
partner when the carrier refused compensation on the ground that
he was not an employee, but one of the employers. The court held
that a partner could be an employee, and compensation was awarded.
2-A statute may be passed making a workman who receives
wages an employee. Such a statute has been passed in California in
1937. It provides "A working member of a partnership receiving
wages irrespective of profits from such partnership is an employee
under this division." 58 The next section reads-"Workmen asso-
ciating themselves under a partnership agreement, the principal pur-
pose of which is the performance of the labor on a particular piece
of work are employees of the person having the work executed. In
respect to injuries which occur while such workmen maintain in
force insurance in an insurer, insuring to themselves and all persons
employed by them benefits identical with those conferred by this divi-
sion the person for whom such work is to be done is not liable as
an employer under this division." 59
3-A statute may extend the benefits of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act to the working members of a partnership without call-
ing them employees.
But under the law as it stands in New York today if the part-
nership is such as to comply with Section 10 of the Partnership Law
it will be upheld even though the avowed motive for its formation is
to evade the Workmen's Compensation Act.60
HUGH PETER MULLEN.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
One of the most cherished attributes of our democratic society is
the right of trial by jury. No less important are the incidents thereto,
as for example, the selection and qualifications of the jurymen. Long
regulated by constitutional and statutory provisions, these rights have
become a bulwark of our system of government.
The following discussion is concerned with one of the elements
of trial practice which has assumed increasing importance, namely, the
57 86 Okla. 139 207 Pac. 314 (1922).
58 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3359.
59 Id. § 3360.
80 People v. Kaplan, 160 Misc. 179, 288 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1936).
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